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ARTICLE

The Technology of Biopower
A Response to Todd May’s “Foucault Now?”
Ladelle McWhorter, University of Richmond

Because the occasion for his essay was the inaugural conference of the newly
formed Foucault Society in New York City in the spring of 2005, Todd May
takes as his point of departure the question of whether Foucault’s work is
valuable to the sort of people who have come together to form that society:
philosophers, artists, political activists, and in general to concerned citizens
today, twenty years after Michel Foucault’s death. As might be expected
given the Society’s raison d’être, May answers this question in the affirmative.
But exactly how is Foucault’s work still relevant? It is his answer to this latter
question that is the philosophical substance of May’s address.
In the course of pursuing this question—which he phrases as “Foucault
Now?”—May makes a point that at first seems to tell against his conviction
that Foucault’s work still has much to teach. He acknowledges that Foucault
never claimed to be presenting us with a timeless picture of the human
condition; on the contrary, Foucault’s central point was that history occurs as
a series of utterly contingent events that shape human beings in their
contingency. How and who we are may not have anything in common with
how and who people were in earlier times. That being the case, Foucault’s
relevance is all the more contestable: If history has given us living conditions
importantly different from the living conditions of our predecessors, even
those of only twenty years ago, might not we ourselves already be so different
from Foucault and his generation that his descriptions and analyses no longer
have anything to say to us? Or at least might Foucault’s texts have an
expiration date, even if it has not quite yet arrived?
May has no intention of arguing that, on the contrary, Foucault’s works
are timeless. Like everything Foucault examined, his own analyses are
eminently perishable, and May emphasizes that point. But he insists that the
expiration date is probably yet a long way off—not because important
changes have not occurred since 1985, changes that may have significantly
changed us, but because we still need Foucault’s methods and analytic style
to take account of and assess those changes, as well as to resist what we find
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oppressive in them. Those people who would have us believe that everything
is different now—given the revolution in computer chip technology, the fall
of the Soviet Union, 9/11—are not moving beyond Foucault, May contends;
instead they are refusing the methodological insights that Foucault offers by
reverting to a modernist tendency to espouse a unified, totalized story about
the world rather than paying attention to the fragmentary details that a
genealogical method does not allow us to overlook.
May mentions Gilles Deleuze and Jean Baudrillard in this connection.
Deleuze says society no longer operates as Foucault says it does in Discipline
and Punish and elsewhere. We are not a normalized society, Deleuze holds,
but a control society. We are disciplined not by statistical and spatial
distributions as Foucault discusses in such depth but rather by the techniques
of surveillance and management possible only in an age of instant
communication. Baudrillard, too, emphasizes the technological changes in
communication and imaging that have occurred in recent years and argues
that we are shaped as subjects in the midst of the “hyper‐real.” Foucault’s
accounts of architecture and regimented corporeal practices are therefore
passé, he maintains. May also notes that there is an increasing number of
thinkers who assert that economic globalization has so changed the field
within which subjectivities emerge and attempt to work, consume, and
sustain themselves that it makes no sense to use analytic models of selfhood
or society from two decades ago.
May does a fine job of showing that all these announcements of our
collective departure from the normalized world that Foucault describes are
really not advances into the post‐modern so much as returns to the modern.
They are attempts to understand by generalizing and covering over minute
differences that, according to Foucault and May, make all the difference “on
the ground.” Our present, May asserts, is simply not reducible to any
monolithic explanation. Even if things are radically different from the way
they were twenty years ago, if we are to understand how they are different
and what difference those differences make, we need to approach our world
as Foucault approached his—genealogically, responsively, attentively,
attuned to its depth and detail. Have technological changes really rendered
corporeal disciplinary practices and sexual normalization, for example,
obsolete? Have fiber‐optic and satellite technologies really rendered
surveillance unnecessary, or have they just made new kinds of surveillance
possible—now that people can implant tracking devices under their children’s
skin and ask their cars or their cell phones where to turn to find the nearest
public restroom or luxury hotel? Have adventures in cyberspace displaced
sexuality as a source of knowledge and pleasure, belonging and identity,
docility and control, or has computer technology simply extended the
disciplinary practices of sexuality farther than ever before, into populations
and moments previously impervious to many of its effects? May is skeptical
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of claims that our world has changed radically in the last two decades. But, he
insists, opining from an armchair is no way to settle the matter. We need to
investigate. We need to practice something like genealogy to answer
questions like this and to understand how these changes operate or shift in
operation over time. And that is precisely why Foucault’s work is still
relevant; Foucault’s work shows us how to engage our own world, different
and changing though it may be, in a careful interrogation so that we can learn
just what is at stake in each technological, political, economic, or social shift.
Most importantly, May claims, it is only by really understanding how
we got here—which is what genealogy enables us to do—that we can see
what possibilities remain to us for changing things. The only way to imagine
and bring forth a future different from the present is to see how the present
evolved from the contingencies of the past. Seeing what was and what
happened enables us to see what might have been otherwise and what still
might become otherwise. Genealogy, unlike the totalizing discursive gaze
from above, demonstrates the play within the system, revealing the freedom
that is still ours to exercise. Foucault is important now because Foucault
affirms our importance as actors in an open‐ended story. The future does not
lie curled up in a painful present, Foucault shows us. It is not already there
just waiting to unfold. It must be made. And we can have a hand in that
making. Foucault’s work offers hope.
The hope, and help, it offers is not just or even primarily a product of
the facts and methodology it presents us, May suggests. If that were so, we
could read the texts and set them aside, having gleaned from them all that we
need to know. But May thinks even those of us who have read the texts
thoroughly, even many times, have reason to return to them now and in the
foreseeable future. For reading Foucault, May says, is not an exercise in the
excavation of facts but rather an exercise in spiritual cultivation; it is a way of
remembering, renewing, and reconstituting ourselves. Foucault’s texts—like
the texts of the ancients, Marcus Aurelius’s or Epictetus’s perhaps—can serve
not just to educate us but to orient us intellectually, to point us in the direction
of anti‐normalizing self‐development. They are models of genealogical
thinking, but they also draw us into an enactment of genealogical thinking as
we read; they put us through our genealogical paces, so to speak, put us in
mind of the contingency of things and prevent our thinking from hardening
into set categories and definitive analyses. The practice of reading that
reading Foucault’s texts teach is a self‐transformative practice—no matter
how many times our eyes might scan the pages.
I agree with May wholeheartedly that Foucault’s texts can be used as a
means of self‐cultivation. I agree that his work—especially its genealogical
approach—is still very relevant to our present, regardless of changes in
techniques of population management and social control. I agree that Deleuze
and Baudrillard and others are wrong to sound the death knell for
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normalization and its counter, genealogy. But I do want to raise one question
for May, and that is this: To what extent is normalization—in fact the entire
biopolitical dispositif that Foucault described in relentless detail—dependent
on some specific technological forms?
Like May, I am skeptical of the idea that high tech innovations have
done or are likely to do much if anything to alter biopower in its basic
functioning and the directions of its spread. Despite liberal hopes that new
technologies such as the internet would have a democratizing or freeing
effect, creating difference by decentralizing authority, biopower (as Foucault
has shown) operates quite well in decentralized fashion; and more and
quicker access to individual bodies and local practices make normalization
and population management easier, not more difficult. Biopower is not at risk
in technological innovation. But, I would contend, it is not simply immune to
any and all technological change. Surely some forms of technological collapse
would seriously undermine the institutions and repetitive practices of
biopower by hampering their access and extension. After all, as Foucault
would be the first to acknowledge, biopower is material; it exists, even as a
vast apparatus, in its exercise, and its exercise depends on and occurs at least
in part as the deployment of the tools it has helped to develop since its own
advent in the late nineteenth century.
We should not forget that biopower in all its glory emerged at just
about the same time as the oil industry emerged in the US (at the end of the
1860s) and made enormous, leaping gains in momentum as the nation‐states
of the industrialized world converted to a petroleum economy based on
ubiquitous petroleum‐derived and dependent technologies. Basic techniques
of normalization—for example, extensive record‐keeping and surveillance—
were possible without petroleum and natural gas (as Bentham’s plan for the
Panopticon demonstrates), but they were not possible on anything like the
massive scale that they are with the inventive development and extensive use
of petroleum products over the last one hundred and forty years.
On first glance one might think that much of modern technology—
such as surveillance cameras or computers—are not petroleum products and
do not use oil in their operation. We tend to think of electricity, largely
generated world‐wide by hydro‐electric and coal power, as independent of
the oil industry, but the fact is that it is not; most of the machinery in power
plants that produce electricity from moving water and fuels other than
petroleum and natural gas are built and transported, as well as maintained,
with the aid of oil. Without oil, none of those technologies would be viable.
And without plastics made from petroleum, we would have no cell phones,
no laptops, no light‐weight cameras, recording devices, or vehicles. Virtually
all of the surveillance and record‐keeping technology currently in use
depends on the availability of oil. To realize the almost incredible degree to
which our biopolitical world is dependent on petroleum, one only has to look
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around the room in which one is sitting at any given moment and ask what
would not be there if there were no petroleum‐derived synthetic materials, no
gasoline or diesel or jet fuel, and no petroleum‐based lubricants or coolants.
And what would happen if the oil from which those things and their
replacements are made or transported were to stop flowing? What exercises
of power would no longer be possible?
My suspicion is that without oil, biopower as a vast network of
interlocking and overlapping practices would soon break down. One simply
cannot manage entire populations of hundreds of thousands of people
without satellites and micro‐chips, and one cannot launch satellites or build
micro‐chips without oil. First, large interlocking networks would fragment
into smaller normalizing units. Eventually, unable to profit from the large‐
scale reinforcement of a huge biopolitical network, even those smaller units
might break down. The end of oil may well come in this century, perhaps
even long before this century’s end. Will that moment also bring the death of
biopower?
My point is not that Todd May is wrong to suggest that Foucault’s
work is relevant today. On the contrary, I believe he is right. Foucault’s work
is relevant both as a model of and occasion for genealogical inquiry and as a
description of much of our still very (in fact still increasingly) normalized,
biopolitical present. My point is that resistance to normalizing biopower may
be augmented, whether we like it or not, in the fairly near future by the rising
cost and increasing scarcity of oil and the fact that any alternative viable on a
comparable scale is a long way off. As normalizing practices become more
difficult to effect, opportunities for resistance will become more frequent and
varied—even as new dangers loom. If this description of the future is correct,
the practice of genealogy now is all the more imperative. Those of us who
would resist normalization need to understand how biopower articulates
with the petroleum industry and technologies dependent upon it. We need a
genealogy of petro‐bio‐power in order to understand the biggest difference
between our present and Foucault’s, which is that we stand at the beginning
of the end of an economy and a culture predicated upon a single resource:
crude oil. And if we are to understand our time, prepare for the new set of
dangers upcoming, and take advantage of the opportunities for resistance and
the practice of freedom that this volatile point in history affords, Todd May is,
in my opinion, absolutely right: “We must become more Foucaultian rather
than less.” We must not merely study Foucault’s genealogies; we must
transform ourselves through the practice of genealogy as a spiritual exercise.
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